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Abstract
The music industry has repeatedly expressed concerns over potentially devastating
impacts of online music sharing. Initial attempts to control online ﬁle sharing have
been primarily through consumer education and legal action against the operators of
networks that facilitated ﬁle sharing. Recent legal action against individual ﬁle sharers
marked an unprecedented shift in the industry’s strategy. The focus now is on wellpublicized legal threats and actions on a relatively small group of individuals to
discourage overall music ﬁle sharing. To determine the resulting impact of these legal
threats, we passively tracked online ﬁle-sharing behavior of over 2,000 individuals.
We found that individuals who share a substantial number of music ﬁles react to
legal threats differently from those who share a lesser number of ﬁles. Importantly,
our analysis indicates that even after these legal threats and the resulting lowered
levels of ﬁle sharing, the availability of music ﬁles on these networks remains
substantial.

I.

Introduction

I

n recent years, peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle-sharing technology has opened new
channels for legitimate online distribution of digital products including re
corded music. This has resulted in challenges and opportunities for entities
involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of such digital
goods (Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman 1999; Gopal, Bhattacharjee, and
Sanders 2006). But this same technology also provides the means for unau
thorized copying and distribution of such goods (Gopal and Sanders 1997;
Gopal et al. 2004). The popularity and availability of online music ﬁle-sharing
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(CIDRIS), the Treibick Electronic Commerce Initiative, the XEROX Connecticut Information
Technology Institute (CITI) Endowment Fund, and the Gladstein Endowed MIS Research Lab
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networks has attracted the interests of diverse groups including the music
industry, consumers, artists, the popular press, and government legislative
bodies.
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the trade group
that represents the U.S. recording industry,1 has repeatedly expressed concern
over music-sharing activities. Claiming that the impact of online music piracy
on its business has been “devastating” (Feuilherade 2004), the music industry
has called for greater copyright enforcement and stronger regulations. In the
past, RIAA has issued threats aimed only at the “operators” of P2P networks
(Harmon 2003). In 2000, RIAA sued and successfully shut down Napster,
one of the ﬁrst P2P ﬁle-sharing networks that facilitated digital music sharing.
But the popularity of music sharing, instead of being dampened by the forced
closure of Napster, was reinvigorated by the advent of several secondgeneration P2P networks, the so-called Sons of Napster. The new networks
do not maintain a central directory of ﬁles like Napster did, hence they have
avoided legal repercussions from appearing to aid illegal ﬁle sharing.2 Con
sequently, these networks act as decentralized peer groups, where individual
ﬁle sharers act as both ﬁle and information repositories. Among these net
works, Kazaa, launched in March 2001, appears to be currently the most
popular, with over 60 million subscribers (Kazaa.com 2004).
In response to this “epidemic of illegal ﬁle sharing” (RIAA 2003a), on
June 26, 2003, RIAA redirected legal threats toward individual subscribers
of these networks who, in the past, enjoyed anonymity in P2P environments.
Prior to RIAA’s recent legal efforts, individual ﬁle sharers were almost com
pletely immune from legal liability when violating copyright law. These
recent legal developments have considerably altered that perceived notion
(Graham 2003; Lichtman 2003). Owing to the impracticality of ﬁling lawsuits
against every individual ﬁle sharer, RIAA has chosen to focus on a relatively
small group of individuals and maximize the publicity surrounding its legal
action to discourage the overall participation in ﬁle-sharing networks.
But how did music sharers actually react to these legal threats? To date,
we have anecdotal evidence provided by two very popular sharing sites,
Kazaa and Grokster, but little detailed or speciﬁc information. For example,
Kazaa and Grokster indicated that trafﬁc on June 26, 2003, after the threat
did not decrease signiﬁcantly. With an average of 4 million users at any time,
Kazaa reported 4.2 million users around 5:30 p.m. on June 26 (post threat).
Similarly, Grokster reported 3.8 million users at 6:00 p.m. (normal range,
3.5–4.5 million users) (Manuse 2003). Without access to detailed real data,
1
The four major music companies are Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, SonyBMG. and EMI.
2
The very recent Supreme Court holding in the Grokster case suggests that peer-to-peer
(P2P) operators must take care. Currie (2005) suggests that P2P operators must “not induce
copyright infringement” and must make sure “that there is a non-infringing use for the software”
such as sharing photos or personally developed software.
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there is little to conﬁrm or refute the claims of interested parties such as
RIAA and the music industry or Kazaa and Grokster. Other research studies
(for example, a recent Pew Survey) have relied on surveys of private indi
viduals in an effort to gauge an individual’s piracy activity (Wingﬁeld 2004,
p. B4). But this involves asking individuals to report, however assuredly
“anonymously,” on their own illegal activity. Wingﬁeld (2004, p. B1) noted,
“The Pew survey relies on consumers honestly reporting their online habits;
some users may be less likely to admit they are downloading music owing
to negative publicity surrounding ﬁle-sharing.”
We began our work by asking whether we could track actual individual
behavior and identify what actually was happening following legal threats.
Because ﬁle sharing occurs on the Internet, it is possible to gather relevant
data in real time. Acting solely as an observer and not as a participant, it is
possible to track an individual’s ﬁle-sharing behavior across time and analyze
any potential behavioral shifts surrounding major events. To accomplish this,
we developed innovative data observation and capturing processes that di
rectly measure the online P2P ﬁle-sharing activity of individuals. In effect,
these tools act as proverbial “ﬂies on the wall,” silently observing ﬁle-sharing
behavior (Bhattacharjee et al., in press).
Our analysis provides before-and-after scrutiny of individual ﬁle-sharing
behavior for the time frame during which four important events unfolded.
These events are (1) the RIAA threats of legal action, (2) the initiation of
legal actions, (3) a legal setback to RIAA, and (4) a reiteration by RIAA of
continuing legal actions. All these events were widely reported by both
popular media (Mainelli 2003). The research hypotheses, drawn from the
theory of consumer utility maximization, provide the basic foundation to
address the research questions. While we observe individual behavior that
is consistent with utility theory, we also observe stark behavioral differences
in P2P patterns (sharing ﬁles versus being online) and across groups (those
sharing large versus small numbers of ﬁles). Finally, despite RIAA’s efforts
to the contrary and despite a general reduction in individual sharing, op
portunities for anyone seeking to download music ﬁles continue to be abun
dant. The current study represents an early exploration of individual behav
ioral research at a general observation stage that can then lead to formal
theory formulation (see Smith 1976, 1982, 1985; Hoffman et al. 1987; Hoff
man, Marsden, and Whinston 1990) of online music sharing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A brief description
of the four events studied is presented in Section II, followed by a theory
framework and hypotheses in Section III. The data collection details are
covered in Section IV. Empirical results are discussed in Section V, which
includes the overall impact of the events, a detailed analysis of different
types of sharers, and a discussion of the overall impact on ﬁle-sharing op
portunities following these legal actions. We conclude the paper in Section
VI with a summary of ﬁndings and future research directions.
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II.
A.

Description of Events Studied

Event 1: Announcement of Intention to Pursue
Legal Actions (June 26, 2003)

On June 25, RIAA announced for the ﬁrst time that it would pursue legal
action against individual participants of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks. On June
26, it was widely reported in the media that RIAA would “spend the next
month identifying users who offer a signiﬁcant number of songs for others
to copy on ﬁle-sharing networks in the United States and will target those
individuals with lawsuits” (Zeidler 2003). A Seattle Times article reported
by the Associated Press dated June 26, 2003, stated, “The embattled music
industry disclosed aggressive plans today for an unprecedented escalation in
its ﬁght against Internet piracy, threatening to sue hundreds of individual
computer users who illegally share music ﬁles online” (Bridis 2003). Prior
to this announcement, no individual ﬁle sharer had been held accountable
for his participation on P2P networks. This announcement signaled a marked
shift in RIAA’s policy, increasing an individual sharer’s risk of getting caught
and prosecuted for sharing unauthorized music ﬁles.
B.

Event 2: Lawsuits Filed against Alleged Music File Sharers
(September 8, 2003)

After 2 months of evidence gathering, RIAA ﬁled lawsuits against 261
alleged music sharers on September 8, 2003. Although P2P network admin
istrators do not require users to reveal their true identities, computer terminals
of P2P sharers can be identiﬁed by their IP addresses. In order to facilitate
its lawsuits against individual P2P sharers, RIAA ﬁled for subpoenas using
provisions under the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act to force Internet
service providers to reveal “the names of suspected copyright infringers”
through their IP addresses (Gross 2003). As a result, RIAA was able to
identify the alleged ﬁle sharers through their Internet service providers. Ac
cording to RIAA, the defendants of the lawsuits “have been illegally dis
tributing substantial amounts (averaging more than 1,000 copyrighted music
ﬁles each) of copyrighted music on peer-to-peer networks” (RIAA 2003b).
Although most people associate music piracy with teenagers and college
students, the wide range of people named in the lawsuits included a preteen,
an elderly grandparent, and several parents who claimed to be completely
unaware of their children’s online activities (Ahrens 2003).
C.

Event 3: Court Ruling against Revealing Identities of Sharers
(December 19, 2003)

In an ongoing legal dispute with RIAA, Verizon, a major Internet service
provider, ﬁled an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals on the lower court
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decision that permitted RIAA to obtain the names of the 261 music sharers
for its September 8, 2003, lawsuits. On December 19, 2003, the appeals court
argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, passed in 1998, does not
directly address P2P ﬁle trading and overturned the lower court’s decision
(Enders 2003). This decision denied RIAA’s unconventional use of subpoenas
and, in effect, allowed Internet service providers to reject RIAA’s request
for the identities of P2P sharers. Although RIAA could still proceed with
lawsuits by naming IP addresses as defendants, it would have to go through
a rather lengthy litigation process during which the defendants would be
eventually identiﬁed during the court proceeding (McCullagh 2003). In spite
of RIAA’s plan to proceed with this new form of lawsuit, it was expected
that the increased legal cost would hinder RIAA’s ability to sue large numbers
of ﬁle sharers (Ahrens 2004).
D.

Event 4: John Doe Lawsuits (January 21, 2004)

After the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals, RIAA was no longer able
to ﬁle a subpoena and obtain the names of online ﬁle sharers but still con
tinued its data collection to monitor ﬁle-sharing activity. On January 21,
2004, RIAA ﬁled additional lawsuits against 532 alleged ﬁle sharers, iden
tiﬁed by their IP addresses (Roberts 2004). This new form of lawsuit, RIAA
claimed, is “more intrusive” for individual ﬁle sharers (Borland 2003). In
addition, without knowing the names of defendants, RIAA could no longer
offer the opportunity to such individuals for private settlements outside of
court litigation (Borland 2003).
In the next section, we detail our basic utility maximization framework
and set forth the two hypotheses that we study empirically related to the
aforementioned legal actions.
III.

Utility Theory and Implicit Hypotheses

Since the early pioneering work by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
research on the economics of illegitimate activities has widely employed a
utility maximization approach to model individual decision making related
to engaging in illegal activity. We employ a similar approach to draw our
research hypotheses. Earlier works have also explicitly incorporated con
straints on resources (either time or monetary) that dictate that an individual
solve an allocation problem—how much (time) to devote to legal versus
illegal activities. One key difference in the environment we study is that such
constraints do not naturally exist with online ﬁle sharing—participation in
legal and illegal activities can take place simultaneously and can occur at
large quantitative levels. A music consumer can purchase or listen to digitized
music on an authorized retailer’s Web site and, at the same time, participate
in illegal ﬁle sharing of the same or other music. Thus, our hypotheses are
developed from the consideration of cost and beneﬁt of engaging in online
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ﬁle sharing. Further, the environment is in isolation from the constraints
imposed by other external choices.
Consider an individual consumer, i, whose computer has ni music ﬁles (or
songs) stored and available for sharing. We focus on music sharing for mod
eling purposes since RIAA’s legal measures are aimed speciﬁcally at indi
viduals who share music ﬁles rather than those who download. Drawing from
theories of altruism (Constant, Sproull, and Kiesler 1996; Nordblom 1997;
Rapoport 1997; Levine 2001), we assume that i’s beneﬁt from sharing his
ﬁles with other consumers is tied directly to the number of individual songs,
ni, that he makes available for others to download and the amount of time
that he is connected to the P2P network, ti (and thus is available for sharing).
Let Fi be the potential cost faced by individual i from the legal actions
undertaken by RIAA. Thus, Fi represents the level of legal threat that is
assumed to be nondecreasing with respect to the ampliﬁed threats and legal
actions by RIAA to curb ﬁle sharing. We formulate a general utility function
for individual i as Vi p Ui (ni , tiFFi ). We use ni* and t*i to indicate optimal
choices for individual i for a given value of Fi; n*i and t*i are obtained by
solving maxUi (ni , tiFFi ) with respect to ni and ti.
An individual’s reaction to increased enforcement depends on the risk
proﬁle of the individual. Economic studies on criminal behavior indicate that
many individuals seem to prefer risk, which results in law enforcement ac
tivities being less effective than expected (see, for example, Heineke 1978;
Ehrlich 1973; Becker 1968; and Kolm 1973). Heineke (1978) and Ehrlich
(1973) concluded that an increase in law enforcement efforts might cause
risk-preferring individuals to increase their illegal activities. Similarly, an
increase in penalty could also be shown to have the same effect (Ehrlich
1973).
The RIAA’s announcement and subsequent legal actions were clearly in
tended to up the ante, to increase the perceived risk of being caught partic
ipating in unauthorized music sharing (see Graham 2003). The RIAA’s ex
pectations for the outcomes of its action in 2003 appeared to hinge on the
assumption that the majority of the individuals are risk averse and rational.
These observations lead us to posit the following formal hypotheses:
Implicit RIAA Hypothesis 1 (reduced number of ﬁles shared):
�n*/
i �Fi ! 0 (an increase in the level of legal threat would reduce the number
of music ﬁles being shared).
Implicit RIAA Hypothesis 2 (reduced frequency of sharing): �t*/
i �Fi !
0 (an increase in the level of legal threat would reduce the amount of time
an individual spends on ﬁle-sharing networks).
The formal test of hypotheses is conducted from observations on the shar
ing behavior of over 2000 P2P subscribers of Kazaa, over the period of time
during which the four events unfolded. The formal analysis can shed im
portant insights on the differential impacts of legal threats on the patterns of
sharing behavior (number of ﬁles shared versus time spent online). Such
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analysis can also provide indirect evidence of the risk proﬁles of these sub
scribers, that is, the proportions of P2P subscribers who are risk preferring,
risk neutral, and risk averse. Further, we evaluate the hypotheses across two
important subscriber groups: high-level (substantial) sharers and less active
(nonsubstantial) sharers. This comparison is important since RIAA speciﬁ
cally hinted that they were targeting the former group. Did this group react
as RIAA intended? Did the nonsubstantial group feel less threatened and
thus react differently? Overall, were the legal steps taken successful in de
creasing music ﬁle sharing under a P2P environment?
The automated data collection process we employed to garner the data
provides us a unique vantage point to evaluate the hypotheses. The access
to microlevel data enables us to directly test the hypotheses, without a need
to make further behavioral assumptions that are often necessary when work
ing with either macrolevel data or with survey data. The length of the data
set utilized (spanning a year of observation on each individual) also adds
temporal stability and robustness to our empirical ﬁndings. We begin the
analysis by ﬁrst describing the sample selection and data gathering process.
IV.

Data

We developed an automated process to passively track sharing information
from over 2,000 sharers on Kazaa, the most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing network
at the time (Graham 2003). The process operates in the background, taking
snapshot observations of the ﬁle-sharing activities of P2P participants. As
no direct contact was established with the monitored individuals, the process
provided no reason for individuals to alter their ﬁle-sharing behavior.
A.

Sample Selection

On the Kazaa network, a subscriber is identiﬁed through a user ID. Music
ﬁles available on the network are categorized into genres (for example, al
ternative, bluegrass, classical, country, easy listening, folk, hard rock, and
hip hop). We began our data collection effort by conducting searches based
on music genres over a period of 1 week to identify the music ﬁles in each
genre3 and to capture the user ID associated with each music ﬁle. We selected
over 6,000 subscribers (that is, 6,000 unique user IDs) who were on the
network most frequently for the initial pool. We decided on this pool of most
frequent sharers for three reasons: (1) More active sharers would be more
likely to be found or observed on Kazaa; (2) with more active users and no
new users, we sought to minimize any learning effects; with new sharers
(new Kazaa subscribers joining during our sampling period) or novice users,
3
In Kazaa, subscribers can conduct a search based on genre and obtain a list of ﬁles in
these speciﬁc genres.
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TABLE 1
Music Genres Tracked and Number of Associated Sharers
Music Genre
Alternative
Bluegrass
Classical
Country
Easy Listening
Folk
Hard Rock
Hip Hop
Jazz

Unique Sharers Music Genre
143
56
93
74
231
132
124
107
98

Latin
Pop
Punk
Rap
R&B
Rock
Soundtrack
Top 40

Unique Sharers
111
110
93
104
141
100
116
223

Note.—There are 2,056 total sharers.

learning effects might confound the results; and (3) more active sharers appear
to be the type of individuals that RIAA intended to target.
From this initial pool, we sought a sample that would be representative
of the music genre mix. We ﬁrst examined the distribution across music
genres of our sampling pool.4 From this distribution, it appeared that in order
to obtain at least 50 sharers for bluegrass (the smallest stratum), we would
need a total of about 2,000 in our overall sample.5 We continued to run
searches and the random selection process until we obtained a minimum of
50 sharers for each stratum. This resulted in 2,056 unique user IDs distributed
as shown in Table 1.
B.

Data Capture

After obtaining a sample of 2,056 user IDs, we initiated our data-capturing
process as summarized in Table 2. Kazaa’s search engine provided no ability
to search directly by user name or otherwise directly seek out a speciﬁc
sharer. Instead, we had to develop an indirect search process to seek out each
of our 2,056 individual sharers, a process we now detail. To obtain a balanced
portfolio of sharers, we took care to randomly initiate our searches over each
day’s 24 hours. We initiated searches at a random time on Monday of each
week. The program begins by entering a randomly selected keyword iden
tifying one category of music (for example, hard rock) and then conducts a
search to determine if any of our identiﬁed user IDs are currently online at
4
Since a sharer could be associated with ﬁles that belong to more than one music category,
a sharer may be identiﬁed more than once from different search results. When purging any
duplicate IDs, we assigned the individual to that category for which the individual had the
highest percentage of ﬁles made available for sharing.
5
One caveat is that the distribution of music categories naturally changes as sharers download
new ﬁles, sign on and off, or clean up their hard drives. The distribution in our sample could
be different from the actual current distribution on Kazaa. In addition, Kazaa does, from time
to time, add some new music categories.
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TABLE 2
Six-Step Automated Data Capture Process
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6

Process
Initiate a search process using a randomly selected music genre (country, hard rock,
jazz, and so on) and obtain a list of music ﬁles identiﬁed with the genre
Find a match between the user ID on the search result and the preselected list of 2,056
sharers
If a match is found, go to step 4; if a match is not found skip to step 6
Activate Kazaa’s “Find More From Same User” function to obtain a list of shared ﬁles
on the matched user’s computer
Capture and convert the search result into a text ﬁle; ﬂag user ID so if found to be
online again, hard drive is not searched again over the week; record each time user
ID is found online; go to step 2
If no more music genres are left to search, stop; else, initiate another search based on
the next music genre; go to step 2

Kazaa. If there is no match (that is, none of the preidentiﬁed sharers is
currently online at Kazaa and available for sharing), our program randomly
selects one of the remaining unsearched genres as the next keyword and
repeats the search. If a match is found, the program explores the shared folder
on the sharer’s hard drive. This shared folder is the ﬁle directory and sub
directories designated by the individual as a shared resource available for
download by other Kazaa users. The list of ﬁles in the shared folder is shown
on the Kazaa search result screen, and our program captures and stores the
list. After all matched user IDs from a category (music genre) search are
fully exhausted, another randomly selected keyword (music genre) is entered
and the search process continues. This process is repeated each day until the
end of the week (Sunday). Once an individual sharer’s hard drive is scanned
to obtain the shared list of music ﬁles, that individual’s hard drive is not
explored again during the remainder of the week. However, we do record
whether or not an individual is found online during each complete search
process.
C.

Data Summary

The formal data collection started on the week of March 3, 2003, over 3
months prior to the ﬁrst legal event. For analysis purposes, we report on data
collected until the week of March 1, 2004, a date some 5 weeks after the
ﬁnal legal event. Table 3 shows the summary of the ﬁle-sharing activity
during the ﬁrst 4 weeks of the monitoring period. We note a few additional
facts about our observations during the ﬁrst 4 weeks of the monitoring period:
72 of the individuals observed shared fewer than 10 music ﬁles, 350 of the
individuals observed shared fewer than 50 music ﬁles, and 697 of the in
dividuals observed shared fewer than 100 music ﬁles.
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TABLE 3
Initial Proﬁle of 2,056 Kazaa Sharers

Number of audio ﬁles shared
Number of times a sharer appeared per week

V.

Average

Median

Lowest

Highest

216
1.397

140
1.5

1
0

3,901
7

Empirical Analysis

We conduct a formal test of the hypotheses following an event study
approach. Event studies are commonly used in ﬁnancial and economic studies
to evaluate the impact of signiﬁcant events (see, for example, MacKinlay
1997; Peterson 1989). This approach has been applied widely, and speciﬁc
applications include evaluating the impact of an earnings announcement on
the stock price and studying the market reaction to environmental legislation
(Blacconiere and Northcutt 1997), among others. One requirement for event
study analysis to be appropriate is that the event or events were unanticipated.
We conducted searches on Google and Yahoo search engines as well as
Factiva for news stories prior to the actual announcement of each event. We
found no indication of any related news stories preceding the actual an
nouncements. We also monitored several technology related discussion fo
rums (such as slashdot.org) and found no indication of pre-event public
knowledge. Section VA presents the formal test statistic and results from the
evaluation of the hypotheses using the overall data. Section VB presents a
comparative analysis of two key sharer segments—those who share a large
number of ﬁles (substantial sharers) and those who share fewer ﬁles (nonsubstantial sharers). As the former group represents the main target of RIAA,
this comparative analysis can provide useful insights on the overall success
of the legal strategy. Finally, Section VC addresses the demand side of ﬁlesharing. Clearly, individuals share music ﬁles online in order to satisfy the
demand by other users to download and acquire these ﬁles. We examine the
demand side of the ﬁle-sharing equation by evaluating the opportunities to
download music ﬁles, before and after the four legal events. This analysis
provides another important perspective on the overall likelihood of success
of the legal strategy employed by the music industry.
A.

Overall Impact of Events

The statistical test to evaluate the impact of the four legal events was
designed to accommodate two keys factors related to ﬁle sharing: (1) the
ﬁle-sharing behavior (both frequency of being online and the number of ﬁles
shared) between events was not static and exhibited a trend, and (2) the
distribution for both measures of ﬁle-sharing behavior was asymmetric. To
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TABLE 4
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Each Event

Event

Z-Statistic for
Number of
Files Shared

Support for
Hypothesis 1

Z-Statistic for
Frequency of
Being Online

Support for
Hypothesis 2

1.
2.
3.
4.

43.325
�28.135
9.592
�8.861

Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

�17.161 (0)
�17.364 (0)
.140 (.4)
�9.897 (0)

Supported
Supported
Not supported
Supported

Initial announcement
Lawsuits ﬁled
Identity roadblock
John Doe lawsuits

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

account for the former, we tested for changes in the trends of ﬁle-sharing
behavior succeeding each legal event. We employed a nonparametric pro
cedure to account for the latter (Cowan 1992; Sanger and Peterson 1990;
Hite and Vetsuypens 1989; Doukas and Travlos 1988; Brown and Warner
1980). The analysis was designed as follows.
For each legal event, the week during which it was announced was des
ignated as the event window. The pre-event and postevent windows were
the 4 weeks before and after the event window, respectively. Trend shifts in
two variables, the number of sharers who increased their frequency of being
online and the number of sharers who increased the number of ﬁles they
shared, were evaluated following each of the events.
The sign test used in the analysis (see Cowan 1992) is a binomial test on
the frequency of increased ﬁle-sharing activity. Under the null hypothesis,
the proportion of sharers who exhibit increased activity has a binomial dis
tribution with parameter p̂. The sign test examines whether the proportion
of sharers with increased activity is altered in the postevent period. Cowan
(1992) reports that the test is well speciﬁed and powerful under a variety of
conditions. The test statistic is
Zp

w � np̂

�np̂(1 � p̂)

,

where n is the sample size and w is the number of sharers with increased
activity in the postevent 4-week period. Two speciﬁcations of p̂ are commonly
used. In one, p̂ is set to .5. Another speciﬁcation is based on the estimation
of p̂ from the sample unaffected by the event. For the latter speciﬁcation,
we estimate p̂ by splitting the 4-week pre-event period into two 2-week
segments. The estimate of p̂ is the proportion of sharers who increased their
activity from the initial 2-week segment to the latter 2-week segment. Overall,
both estimations yielded consistent results, but, for brevity, we report only
those with p̂ p .5.
The results, presented in Table 4, provide support for the two hypotheses
for all cases except two: hypothesis 1 for event 1 and hypothesis 2 for event

102

the journal of law and economics
TABLE 5
Changes in Frequency of Being Online and Files Shared,
by Number of Sharers

Post event 1:
Frequency of being online
Number of audio ﬁles shared
Post event 2:
Frequency of being online
Number of audio ﬁles shared
Post event 3:
Frequency of being online
Number of audio ﬁles shared
Post event 4:
Frequency of being online
Number of audio ﬁles shared

Increased

Decreased

609
1,490

1,143
299

590
712

1,115
1,124

926
1,059

701
641

683
132

961
1,292

3. While hypothesis 1 is not supported for event 1, the overall response to
event 1 does indicate some degree of risk mitigation behavior on part of the
ﬁle sharers. In response to the RIAA’s initial announcement to pursue law
suits, even though the sharers increased their ﬁle-sharing levels, they did
lower their frequency of being online. Note that hypothesis 1 is supported
for event 3. Even though the number of ﬁles shared exhibited an upward
trend, this event actually represents a setback for RIAA in its legal strategy.
While the frequency of being online did not exhibit a concomitant statistically
signiﬁcant increase in response to event 3, the frequency of usage levels did
not drop. Table 5 presents summary data that indicate the number of sharers
increasing or decreasing their number of ﬁles shared and their observed
frequency of being online. The data in Table 5 are quite consistent with the
ﬁndings discussed above.
While the preceding analysis suggests that a signiﬁcant number of indi
viduals altered their ﬁle-sharing behavior in response to legal threats from
RIAA, the analysis does not indicate the magnitude of these shifts. Table 6
reports the results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the
magnitudes of ﬁle-sharing levels before and after each event are signiﬁcantly
different. These results are consistent with the sign test and suggest that the
number of ﬁles shared increased signiﬁcantly following events 1 and 3 and
decreased signiﬁcantly following events 2 and 4. A categorical breakdown
summarizing the magnitudes of changes following each event is presented
in Table 7. The average and median ﬁle-sharing levels are reported in Table
8. Despite increases following events 1 and 3, overall the average number
of ﬁles shared by an individual dropped dramatically. This drop was most
pronounced following legal event 4.
Table 9 focuses on sharers found at least once in a 4-week period preceding
and a 4-week period succeeding each of the four events. The results presented
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TABLE 6
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Each Event
Z-Statistic for Number
of Files Shared

Event
1.
2.
3.
4.

Initial announcement
Lawsuits ﬁled
Identity roadblock
John Doe lawsuits

25.545
�12.023
9.204
�30.451

Support for
Hypothesis 1

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

TABLE 7
Magnitude of Changes in Sharing Levels
Change
Increased by more than 1,000 ﬁles
Increased by 501–1,000 ﬁles
Increased by 101–500 ﬁles
Increased by 1–100 ﬁles
No change
Decreased by 1–100 ﬁles
Decreased by 101–500 ﬁles
Decreased by 501–1,000 ﬁles
Decreased by more than 1,000 ﬁles

Event 1

Event 2

Event 3

Event 4

3
24
545
918
267
184
96
12
7

1
10
147
554
220
720
363
34
7

11
52
485
511
356
314
285
34
8

0
0
8
124
632
601
613
66
12

in Table 9 indicate that the number of sharers found at least once in the 4
week period dropped steadily, except for an increase in the 4-week period
after event 3. It is interesting to note that since the 4-week period prior to
event 3, the average and median usage levels of sharers found online has
increased. This suggests that while a number of sharers appear to have stopped
using the ﬁle-sharing network, those who remained in the latter part of the
legal action periods studied increased their frequency of usage. However, this
increased frequency of usage did not reach the level that occurred before the
RIAA initiated legal threats and actions. In the next section, we delve a bit
deeper and present a comparative analysis of sharers differentiated by their
levels of ﬁle sharing.
B.

Impact on Substantial and Nonsubstantial Sharers

As part of its legal strategy, RIAA speciﬁcally targeted those who share
“substantial amounts of copyrighted music” (RIAA 2003a). While RIAA did
not ofﬁcially provide a clear deﬁnition of what constitutes “substantial,” at
various points in its interaction with the media, references were made to
numbers such as 800 and 1,000 ﬁles shared (CNN.com 2003; Van Buskirk
2003; Lymann 2004). In this section, we compare and contrast the behavior
of substantial sharers and nonsubstantial sharers. The results presented use
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TABLE 8
Number of Files Shared

Pre event 1
Post event 1
Pre event 2
Post event 2
Pre event 3
Post event 3
Pre event 4
Post event 4

Average

Median

342.82
397.65
279.04
238.03
168.29
199.83
199.83
93.25

227.0
294.2
204.6
177.8
89.0
133.0
133.0
10.5

TABLE 9
Observed Frequency of Being Online before and after
Each of the Four Events
Number of Sharers
Found Online at
Least Once in
4 Weeks
Pre event 1
Post event 1
Pre event 2
Post event 2
Pre event 3
Post event 3
Pre event 4
Post event 4

1,963
1,925
1,842
1,704
1,414
1,519
1,519
1,060

Times Found Per Week
Average

Median

1.4335
1.1974
1.0187
.8120
.6390
.6950
.6950
.8432

1.50
1.25
1.00
.75
.50
.50
.50
.75

Note.—Values for sharers found online at least once in each 4-week period
are reported.

800 ﬁles shared as the cutoff to demarcate substantial sharers. The results
of our sensitivity analysis show that all the ﬁndings continue to hold in the
range of 500–1,000 ﬁles shared.
Tables 10 and 11 provide the results for sign and magnitude tests (detailed
in the previous section) for nonsubstantial sharers. The results for nonsub
stantial sharers are very similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 6 for the
entire group studied. In fact, the test outcome pattern is identical.
However, when we perform the tests on the data for substantial sharers
(Tables 12 and 13), we observe several differences. The sign test results
indicate that a signiﬁcant number of substantial sharers decreased their shar
ing levels in response to event 1. Thus the proportion of sharers who de
creased their sharing levels was substantially more than the proportion that
increased their sharing levels. However, the overall magnitude of ﬁle-sharing
levels did not decrease in response to event 1. Substantial sharers responded
to event 3 by lowering both the sharing and the usage levels, despite the fact
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TABLE 10
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Nonsubstantial Sharers

Event

Z-Statistic for
Number of
Files Shared

Support for
Hypothesis 1

Z-Statistic for
Frequency of
Being Online

Support for
Hypothesis 2

1.
2.
3.
4.

28.568
�18.684
10.654
�7.889

Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

�17.121 (0)
�16.698 (0)
.829
(.2)
�8.9358 (0)

Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported

Initial announcement
Lawsuits ﬁled
Identity roadblock
John Doe lawsuits

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

TABLE 11
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Nonsubstantial Sharers

Event
1.
2.
3.
4.

Initial announcement
Lawsuits ﬁled
Identity roadblock
John Doe lawsuits

Z-Statistic for Number
of Files Shared
26.794
�10.938
9.991
�29.688

(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)

Support for
Hypothesis 1
Not supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

that this event represented a setback for RIAA. This behavior is markedly
different from that of the nonsubstantial sharers.
Note that the constitution of the substantial sharer group is temporally
ﬂuid. A sharer who in a particular week shares over 800 music ﬁles may
reduce his sharing levels in the subsequent weeks sufﬁciently to move into
the nonsubstantial group. To obtain insights on these temporal dynamics, we
segment the overall duration into ﬁve time epochs: before event 1, between
events 1 and 2, between events 2 and 3, between events 3 and 4, after event
4. Within each time epoch, we classify an individual sharer into the substantial
group (denoted as S) if at any point in the time window 800 or more music
ﬁles were shared by that individual. Otherwise, the individual is placed in
the nonsubstantial group (denoted as N). With this segmentation, an indi
vidual sharer could potentially take any one of 32 (25) possible paths. Figure
1 displays the number of individuals in each path. For ease of exposition,
only those paths followed by 10 or more individuals are shown. Table 14
illustrates the average sharing levels and frequency of online usage along
each of the shown paths.
We note the following:
1. While RIAA targeted the segment that shared a large number of ﬁles,
the legal threats also appear quite effective against individuals whose initial
ﬁle-sharing levels were low. An overwhelming majority of these individuals
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TABLE 12
Sign Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Substantial Sharers
Z-Statistic for
Number of
Files Shared

Event
1.
2.
3.
4.

Initial announcement
Lawsuits ﬁled
Ldentity roadblock
John Doe lawsuits

�1.651
�4.715
�1.923
�6.953

(.049)
(0)
(.027)
(0)

Support for
Hypothesis 1
Supported
Supported
Not supported
Supported

Z-Statistic for
Frequency of
Being Online
�2.4188
�4.7691
�3.6537
�5.3300

Support for
Hypothesis 2

(.0078)
Supported
(0)
Supported
(.00013) Not Supported
(0)
Supported

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

TABLE 13
Magnitude Test: Results of Hypotheses Tests for Substantial Sharers

Event
1. Initial
announcement
2. Lawsuits ﬁled
3. Identity roadblock
4. John Doe lawsuits

Z-Statistic for Number
of Files Shared
1.395
�5.398
�2.536
�7.048

(.0815)
(0)
(.0056)
(0)

Support for
Hypothesis 1
Not supported
Supported
Not supported
Supported

Note.—Values are in parentheses are p-values.

not only stayed consistently below the threshold of 800, they further reduced
the average number of ﬁles they shared by more than a third.
2. The group that initially shared a substantial number of ﬁles displayed
a staggered reaction to the legal threats. The largest segment of this group
reduced their sharing levels after event 2; the second largest segment of this
group reduced below the threshold after event 3. Together, by the end of the
span of the four legal events, these two segments eliminated over 90 percent
of the ﬁles they initially shared. There was, however, a small segment (11
individuals) that appears to be undeterred by the RIAA threats and actions.6
3. Note that with the exception of the 11-member S-S-S-S group, the
frequency of usage was quite similar between the substantial and nonsub
stantial groups, both before and after legal events. Of particular note, the 11
member S-S-S-S group increased their usage levels after event 4.
With the exception of one set of 11 individuals (the persistent S-S-S-S
group), individuals exhibited behavior changes consistent with avoided being
6
Consider the results reported in Figure 1. While there remain 11 “stubborn” substantial
sharers, these may actually be non-U.S. sharers. Given the unlikely reach of U.S. legal sanctions
to foreigners, one would expect foreign residents to largely ignore legal threats. There were
initially 137 substantial sharers, but only 11 remained at the end of our study period. Put
another way, some 92 percent of substantial sharers reduced their activity enough to fall into
the nonsubstantial level. Thus, our results may understate the impact of the events on U.S.
sharers.
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Figure 1.—Substantial and nonsubstantial sharer dynamics

targeted for suit by RIAA. By the end of the fourth event, all groups but the
“stubborn 11” had reduced average number of ﬁles shared to 355 or fewer.
In the next section we consider the changing music ﬁle-sharing landscape
by looking from the perspective of a potential downloader. Have the RIAA
actions effectively reduced opportunities to share?
C.

Overall Impact on Peer-to-Peer File-Downloading Opportunities

Thus far, we presented our results based on our observations and analysis
of 2,056 individual sharers. But consider a different perspective, that of an
individual seeking to obtain music ﬁles for downloading. That is, consider
how the individual sharer reactions collectively affect the overall availability
of music ﬁles on a P2P network. In a sense, RIAA has chosen a strategy

TABLE 14
Sharing Details for Each Path from Figure 1
Average Number of Files Shared
Path
NrNrNrNrN
NrSrNrNrN
NrSrSrSrN
SrSrNrNrN
SrSrSrNrN
SrSrSrSrN
SrSrSrSrS

Weekly Average Frequency of Being Online

Pre Event 1

Between 1
and 2

Between 2
and 3

Between 3
and 4

Post Event
4

Pre Event 1

Between 1
and 2

Between 2
and 3

Between 3
and 4

Post Event
4

256
619
585
1,432
1,223
1,292
1,414

312
879
941
1,626
1,319
1,432
1,474

210
457
1,054
426
1,190
1,311
1,291

157
278
1,049
291
253
1,137
1,411

71
127
307
123
114
355
1,168

1.4
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.5
1.3

1.3
1.3
1.5
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.6

.8
.9
.9
.8
.7
.6
.7

.5
.6
.5
.4
.6
.6
.4

.4
.4
.4
.3
.2
.5
1.0

Note.—The ﬁve time epochs are before event 1 (before the initial announcement), between events 1 and 2 (between initial announcement and lawsuits ﬁled), between
events 2 and 3 (between lawsuits ﬁled and identify roadblock), between events 3 and 4 (between identify roadblock and John Doe lawsuits), after event 4 (after John Doe
lawsuits).
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TABLE 15
Availability of Files per Album of Billboard Top 100 Albums
on Peer-to-Peer Network
Week of
March 17, 2003
March 15, 2004

Average

SD

Low

High

487
351

401.96
370.86

123
33

1,682
1,245

that seems consistent with the “war on drugs.” Drug enforcement agencies
have targeted the supply side (large suppliers and large shipments—sharers)
rather than the demand side (users—downloaders). There are repeated stories
of massive drug shipments seized and kingpins arrested, but drug usage
continues. Drugs remain pervasive. What about the music availability for
those who wish to download? We selected the top 20 best-selling albums on
the Billboard chart during the reporting weeks of March 17, 2003 (before
the legal events), and March 15, 2004 (after the events), and track the avail
ability of music ﬁles associated with these top-selling albums. During each
of these two 1-week periods, we performed a daily search on WinMx, another
popular ﬁle-sharing network, to capture the number of individual music ﬁles
associated with each of the top 20 albums. We selected WinMx instead of
Kazaa for this analysis because Kazaa returns no more than 200 results in
response to a search query for a music ﬁle, while WinMx has no such
restrictions. (It is important to note that Kazaa has no limitation on individual
sharer searches that we analyzed in the previous sections.) WinMx continually
searches for the selected music ﬁle until the searcher terminates the search.
As shown in Table 15, although the average number of ﬁles available from
each search (each album) decreased by almost 30 percent, a search for music
ﬁles associated with these popular albums still returns more than 300 indi
vidual ﬁles available for download. Even though RIAA threats and legal
actions appear to have had some success in reducing the total number of
music ﬁles available on P2P networks, there remained at least 33 copies (and
up to 1,300) of items on each of the Billboard top 100 albums.
Given the results observed in earlier subsections, it would seem that RIAA
actions did affect the sharing behavior of individuals. There is indication that
the average number of ﬁles shared declined, at least by event 4, across almost
all sharers. Still, for any individual wanting to download, there remain quite
a few options. The RIAA may have succeeded more in reducing the average
availability of ﬁles than in reducing piracy. If Grokster’s and Kazaa’s state
ments are correct and P2P trafﬁc quickly bounced back after legal threats
and actions, then it may simply be that individuals are not downloading less
but are sharing less (that is, making fewer of their music ﬁles shared or
accessible for downloading).
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VI.

Conclusion

Our research question centered on illegal music sharing and involved the
analysis of how individuals actually responded to legal threats from the
recording industry. By developing an automated process, we were able to
track the sharing behavior of 2,056 individuals before and after four RIAArelated events. That is, our analysis utilized microlevel data tracked across
time. Three of the events were RIAA’s formal threat that they would be
pursuing legal action, the announcement that initial suits had been ﬁled, and
the announcement that a second round of suits had been ﬁled. The other
event involved an appellate court ruling that RIAA could not subpoena certain
sharer identifying information from Internet service providers.
Our analysis indicates mixed success for RIAA’s strategy. On the positive
side, before- and after-event comparisons suggest that over the course of the
four events, the majority of substantial sharers decreased the number of ﬁles
shared, typically by more than 90 percent. During this period, a majority of
nonsubstantial sharers reduced sharing activity, typically to a third of their
original levels. Further, a substantial number of sharers exhibited some risk
mitigation behavior. On the other hand, some ﬁndings pose concern for the
recording industry. We found an upsurge in the frequency of usage after
event 3 from the sharers who continue to use the ﬁle-sharing network. These
individuals are continuing to ﬁnd value in accessing and using P2P networks.
Next, although our analysis identiﬁed RIAA-intended behavioral changes
following RIAA’s legal threats and legal actions, there remain fairly wide
downloading options. That is, after the four events, we still found a fairly
wide choice for anyone seeking to download music ﬁles. Another cause for
concern is that even if the individual behavioral changes we observed are
linked to an actual lessening of piracy, there is still the fact that the legal
action did not come without a price to RIAA itself. Many critics of RIAA’s
actions against individual consumers suggested that its legal efforts may be
perceived as heavy-handed and could create a backlash on the music industry
itself (Graham 2003; Ahrens 2003). The New York Daily News also reported
a potential public backlash as it featured on its front-page headline a 12
year-old child named as defendant in an RIAA lawsuit (Sangha and Furman
2003). Shell (2003) pointed out that in dealing with music piracy, the music
industry’s legal success in suing its own potential customers may not be as
important as its potential future success in adjusting its business strategy
(Byrne 2003; Evans 2002). There are various signs of experiments with new
strategies, as recently evidenced from new licensing options that allow sharers
rights to freely share the music (Bhattacharjee et al. 2006; Smith 2004).
While our results are consistent with the effect intended by RIAA, we feel
it necessary to add the following caveat. It is possible that the observed
reduction in ﬁle sharing on Kazaa may have been at least partially linked to
a shift by sharers to other sharing networks. While we cannot rule this out,
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we do have information from another sharing network (WinMx), which is
noted in Section VC. As described above, we found a similar general down
ward trend in the P2P ﬁle-downloading opportunities, which suggests that
there was no large-scale shift in usage from Kazaa (the largest sharing net
work during our observation period) to WinMX (the second largest sharing
network during our observation period). Finally, we found no reported sharp
increase in the usage of smaller networks in the popular press.
Taken as a whole, our results lead us to posit that individuals have, to a
very large extent, responded in the direction intended by RIAA. In fact, the
effect on U.S. sharers may be stronger than our numerical results indicate
because the few (11) who remained as stubborn sharers may well be foreignbased sharers (see note 6). However we also note that a signiﬁcant number
of sharers tended to move below the threat levels (800 or 1,000 ﬁles shared)
rather than exit from sharing activity. The RIAA could lower the threat level
or the number of ﬁles shared at which an individual sharer might be pursued.
But lawsuits cost real money. How many suits is it reasonable for RIAA to
pursue? At the present time, what we can say is that the previously substantial
sharers are tending to still actively share (albeit fewer ﬁles), and downloading
options still abound for those seeking to download. We continue to track and
monitor while we watch for the development by the recording industry of
market mechanisms that might be more effective—will market options
emerge that do not require costly legal actions and yet both enhance industry
net revenue while lowering the cost of music to consumers?
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